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Abstract
Kroedel (2012; 2013a; 2013b) has proposed a new solution, the permis-
sibility solution, to the lottery paradox. The lottery paradox results from the
Lockean thesis according to which one ought to believe a proposition just
in case one’s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. The permissibility
solution replaces the Lockean thesis by the permissibility thesis according
to which one is permitted to believe a proposition if one’s degree of belief
in it is sufficiently high. This note shows that the epistemology of belief
that results from the permissibility thesis and the epistemology of degrees of
belief is empty in the sense that one need not believe anything, even if one’s
degrees of belief are maximally bold. Since this result can also be achieved
by simply dropping the Lockean thesis, or by replacing it with principles
that are logically stronger than the permissibility thesis, the question arises
what the permissibility solution is a solution of.
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Kroedel (2012) has proposed a new solution, the permissibility solution, to
the lottery paradox (Kyburg 1961: 197 and, much clearer, Hempel 1962: 163f).
The lottery paradox shows that a plausible thesis, viz. the Lockean thesis (Foley
2009, Hawthorne 2009), leads to inconsistency when combined with other theses
about belief and about degrees of belief. The Lockean thesis says that an ideal
doxastic agent ought to believe a proposition just in case her degree of belief
for the proposition is sufficiently high. The permissibility solution replaces the
Lockean thesis by the permissibility thesis according to which one is permitted
to believe a proposition if one’s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. This
note shows that the epistemology of belief that results from the permissibility
thesis and the epistemology of degrees of belief is empty in the sense that one
need not believe anything, even if one’s degrees of belief are maximally bold.
Since this result can also be achieved by simply dropping the Lockean thesis, or
by replacing it with principles that are logically stronger than the permissibility
thesis, the question arises what the permissibility solution is a solution of.
In order to discuss Kroedel (2012; 2013a; 2013b)’s proposal it will prove use-
ful to formalize the Lockean thesis in various flavors. For the sake of simplicity let
us assume that there is a context-independent threshold c that specifies just how
high sufficiently high is. Let us also assume that the threshold c is the same for all
propositions under consideration.
Let a be the ideal doxastic agent, and Ba her belief relation, and Pra her degree
of belief function. O (·) is the operator for obligation, and O (· | ·) is the operator
for conditional obligation. The permissibility operators can be introduced as the
duals of the obligation operators: P (·) = ¬O (¬·) and P (· | ·) = ¬O (¬· | ·). ↔ is
the material biconditional.
Locke 1 For all propositions (that are expressible in the underlying language) A,
Ba (A)↔ Pra (A) > c.
Locke 2 For all propositions A, O (Ba (A)↔ Pra (A) > c).
Locke 3 For all propositions A, O (Ba (A))↔ O (Pra (A) > c).
Locke 4 For all propositionsA,O (Ba (A) | Pra (A) > c ∧ X) andO (Pra (A) > c | Ba (A) ∧ Y).
Locke 1 is logically stronger than Locke 2 which in turn is logically stronger
than Locke 3. Locke 1 is logically stronger than Locke 4, whatever the exact
nature of X and Y. We will see that Locke 4 is the best formalization of the
Lockean thesis, as the lottery paradox does not arise for Locke 2 or Locke 3.
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X andY are “admissible” propositions. What counts as admissible will depend
on the underlying deontic logic, among others (see the appendix). For present
purposes X can be assumed to be information about Pra and Ba that is consistent
with Pr (A) > c and does not conflict with any of the norms mentioned below.
Similarly for Y, except that Y is information about Ba and Pra that is consistent
with Ba (A).
The Lockean thesis is of philosophical interest, because it allows us to derive
the epistemology of belief from the epistemology of degrees of belief. (Strictly
speaking it is the doxastology of belief and of degrees of belief, but I will follow
standard usage.) Unfortunately the Lockean thesis results in paradox. It violates
our expectations on the epistemology of belief once we start to fill in the details
of our epistemology of degrees of belief. The latter will include the following,
among others. For all real numbers x and y, and for all propositions A and C (in
some algebra of propositions) over some non-empty set of possible worlds W that
are jointly inconsistent in the sense that A ∩ C = ∅:
1. O (Pra (A) ≥ 0)
2. O (Pra (W) = 1)
3. O
(
Pra (A ∪ C) = x + y | Pra (A) = x ∧ Pra (C) = y) and
O
(
Pra (A) = x | Pra (A ∪ C) = x + y ∧ Pra (C) = y) and
O
(
Pra (C) = y | Pra (A ∪ C) = x + y ∧ Pra (A) = x). Etc.
This formalization is incomplete, as there are many further conditional obliga-
tions. It may also seem somewhat unorthodox. However, this formalization is
logically weaker, even once completed, than the standard formulation of the prob-
ability calculus without the operators for obligation and conditional obligation. It
is so in the exact same way that Locke 4 is logically weaker than Locke 1.
I assumeO (·) to be equivalent toO (· | T) for the trivial or tautological (action)
sentence T. Only action sentences will be allowed in the first argument place.
While I have not done so, the reader should also feel free to replace ‘O’ by ‘Oa’,
as these norms are directed at our ideal doxastic agent a, and justified by being
the means to attaining her doxastic goals (Joyce 1998; 2009). Given (a complete
version of) the norms 1-3 it makes sense to additionally assume that c is a real
number not smaller than 1/2, but smaller than 1.
When we add the Lockean thesis to our epistemology of degrees of belief we
get an epistemology of belief. For instance, from Locke 4 and (a complete version
of) 1-3 we can derive that the ideal doxastic agent ought to believe the tautological
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proposition W, and that she ought to believe every logical consequence of any
belief of hers. That is, for appropriate choices of X and Y:
Taut O (Ba (W) | X)
Closure For all propositions A and C with A ⊆ C, O (Ba (C) | Ba (A) ∧ Y).
With Kroedel (2013b) we will supplement Locke 4 with Littlejohn (2012)’s Low,
except that we formalize it as a conditional obligation:
Low For all propositions A, O (¬Ba (A) | Pra (A) < 1 − c ∧ X),
where X is assumed to be information about Pra and Ba that is consistent with
Pr (A) < 1−c and does not conflict with any of the norms mentioned above. Given
Low we can derive that the ideal doxastic agent is not permitted to believe the
contradictory proposition ∅, and that she is not permitted to believe the negation
of any belief of hers. That is, for appropriate choices of X and Y,
Contr O (¬Ba (∅) | X)
Neg For all propositions A, O (¬Ba (¬A) | Ba (A) ∧ Y).
We expect these consequences to be part of epistemology of belief. Unfortunately
there are other norms we expect to be part of our epistemology of belief that we
cannot derive. Indeed, there are norms we expect to be part of our epistemology
of belief that are precluded by Locke 4 in the presence of Low and (a complete
version of) 1-3. The lottery paradox shows the following one to be an example.
Conj For all propositions A and C, O (Ba (A ∩ C) | Ba (A) ∧ Ba (C) ∧ Y).
(Y is again appropriately chosen information about Ba and Pra that is consistent
with Ba (A)∧Ba (C) and does not conflict with any of the norms mentioned above.
I will assume this to be the case for the remainder of this note without explicitly
mentioning it any longer.) The reason is that adding Conj to Locke 4 and Low
and (a complete version of) 1-3 results in a conflict of norms for many seemingly
reasonable distributions Pr of the ideal doxatic agent’s degrees of belief.
Lottery 1 O (Ba (Ticket 1 loses) | Pr), and Lottery 2O (Ba (Ticket 2 loses) | Pr), ... and
Lottery 100 O (Ba (Ticket 100 loses) | Pr)
Lottery 101 O (Ba (Tickets 1, ..., 100 all lose) | Pr)
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Lottery 102 O (Ba (Tickets 1, ..., 100 do not all lose) | Pr)
Lottery 1 follows from Locke 4 and can be read as follows: given that her degrees
are what they are, the ideal doxastic agent ought to believe that ticket 1 loses.
Similarly for Lottery 2,..., Lottery 100, and Lottery 102. Lottery 101 follows
from Lottery 1, ..., Lottery 100, and Conj (in conditional deontic logic; see van
Fraassen 1972). Together Lottery 101 and Lottery 102 and Conj imply
Lottery O (Ba (∅) | Pr)
However, the following consequence of Low and (a complete version of) 1-3
anti-Lottery O (¬Ba (∅) | Pr)
implies the negation of Lottery:
non-Lottery ¬O (Ba (∅) | Pr)
In other words, in the presence of seemingly minimal theses about degrees of
belief and about belief, Locke 4 implies a contradiction.
The lottery paradox also arises if we formulate the Lockean thesis as Locke
1. Interestingly, though, the lottery paradox does not arise if we formulate the
Lockean thesis as Locke 2 or Locke 3, even if 1-3 are strengthened to the standard
formulation of the probability calculus and Conj is analogously strengthened as
follows (⊃ is the material conditional):
For all propositions A and C, Ba (A) ∧ Ba (C) ⊃ Ba (A ∩ C).
What is paradoxical about the lottery paradox is that the epistemology of belief
that we get from Locke 4 and Low and (a complete version of) 1-3 does not
meet our expectations. In order to resolve the inconsistency at least one of the
above mentioned principles has to be given up. Different philosophers have made
different recommendations (e.g. Kyburg 1970, Jeffrey 1970). However, until
recently, none has replaced the Lockean thesis with an alternative thesis that would
allow us to derive the epistemology of belief from the epistemology of degrees of
belief. Maybe this is not possible. Then we need to explain why our expectations,
as formulated in Conj and Contr and Closure and Taut, are misguided. Or maybe
it is possible. Then we need to replace Locke 4 with a different thesis that does not
preclude Conj. Either way, more has to be done if we do not merely want resolve
the inconsistency, but solve the paradox and obtain an epistemology of belief.
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Leitgeb (2013) and Lin & Kelly (2012) have recently proposed substitutes for
the Lockean thesis. Their substitutes do not merely allow for Conj (and the other
principles), their substitutes logically imply Conj (and the other principles) when
conjoined to the epistemology of degrees of belief as formulated in Low and (a
complete version of) 1-3 (that includes norms for conditional degrees of belief).
Leitgeb (2013)’s solution to the lottery paradox may be termed the stability
solution. It replaces the Lockean thesis by the thesis that an ideal doxastic agent
ought to believe a proposition B just in case there is a proposition C implying B
such that the agent’s degree of belief for C conditional on any A consistent with
C is greater than c. Lin & Kelly (2013)’s solution may be termed the sufficiency
solution. It replaces the Lockean thesis by the thesis that the ideal doxastic agent
ought to believe a proposition just in case this proposition is implied by, i.e. a (not
necessarily proper) superset of, the set of most plausible possible worlds. Accord-
ing to Lin & Kelly (2013) the ideal doxastic agent considers a possible world to
be more plausible than another possible world if, and only if, her degree of belief
in the former is sufficiently higher than her degree of belief in the latter. The most
plausible worlds are those for which there is none that is more plausible. Both
the stability solution and the sufficiency solution derive an epistemology of belief
from the epistemology of degrees of belief that meets our expectations as they are
formulated in Taut and Contr and Closure and Conj and still other principles that
date back to Hintikka (1961) and Alchourrón & Gärdenfors & Makinson (1985).
What about the permissibility solution proposed by Kroedel (2012; 2013a;
2013b)? The latter arises by replacing the Lockean thesis with the permissibility
thesis according to which the ideal doxastic agent is permitted to believe a propo-
sition given that her degree of belief in this proposition is sufficiently high. More
specifically, it results by adding the formalization High 5 instead of Locke 4 to
Low and (a complete version of) 1-3.
High 5 For all propositions A, P (Ba (A) | Pra (A) > c ∧ X).
An alternative formalization of the permissibility thesis works with obligations
instead of conditional obligations and so avoids specifications of admissibility:
High 4 For all propositions A, Pra (A) > c ⊃ P (Ba (A)).
However, there may be Is-Ought problems with High 4 (Hume 1739). This is
perhaps clearest when we reformulate High 4 in terms of what is forbidden, F (·) =
¬P (·):
High 4 For all propositions A, F (Ba (A)) ⊃ Pra (A) ≤ c.
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The Munich born poet Christian Morgenstern, well known for the (ridiculing of)
philosophical theses in his poems, explains better than I ever could what is prob-
lematic about the Is-Ought problem and High 4. The following is the last verse of
the poem Die unmögliche Tatsache, which is part of Palmström, 1910, and which
I translate as “The impossible fact”:
Und er kommt zu dem Ergebnis:
»Nur ein Traum war das Erlebnis.
Weil«, so schließt er messerscharf,
»nicht sein kann, was nicht sein darf!«
In addition High 4 has consequences that are presumably not welcome by Kroedel
(2012; 2013a; 2013b), such as
High 4-1 For all propositions A, Pra (A) > c ∧O (Ba (¬A)) ⊃ P (Ba (A)).
Finally, everything I am going to claim about High 5 below is also true for High
4. The same is true for High 4-5, which is logically weaker than High 4 (in the
deontic logic SD4; see Wolen´ski 1990)
High 4-5 For all propositions A, O (Pra (A) > c) ⊃ P (Ba (A)).
Even High 4-5 (and High 4, if we adopt the deontic logic SD4) has consequences
that are presumably not welcome by Kroedel (2012; 2013a; 2013b), such as the
permission to believe a proposition if one’s degree of belief is sufficiently high
even if one already believes its negation:
High 4-5-1 For all propositions A, O (Pra (A) > c) ∧O (Ba (¬A)) ⊃ P (Ba (A)).
For these reasons, and because High 5 does not lead to an inconsistency, I assume
that High 5 is a charitable formalization of the permissibility thesis, and the per-
missibility solution as intended by Kroedel (2012; 2013a; 2013b). It is perhaps
worth noting that the inconsistency is also avoided if we replace Locke 4 by
High 2 For all propositions A, O (Pra (A) > c ⊃ Ba (A)).
High 3 For all propositions A, O (Pra (A) > c) ⊃ O (Ba (A)).
The inconsistency is not avoided if we replace Locke 4 by one of
High 0 For all propositions A, Pra (A) > c ⊃ O (Ba (A)).
High 1 For all propositions A, Pra (A) > c ⊃ Ba (A).
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Adding High 5 instead of Locke 4 to Low and (a complete version of) 1-3 avoids
the inconsistency. It does not solve the lottery paradox, though. Our expectations
as formulated in Taut, for instance, are not met, as the permissibility solution does
not deliver an epistemology of belief according to which an ideal doxastic agent
ought to believe the tautological proposition. While Low implies that our ideal
doxastic agent is not permitted to believe the contradictory proposition, she is not
required to believe the tautological – or, for that matter, any – proposition if we
add High 5 to Low and (a complete version of) 1-3.
Nor are our expectations as formulated in Closure met, as the permissibility
solution does not deliver an epistemology of belief according to which an ideal
doxastic agent ought to believe every logical consequence of all her beliefs. The
ideal doxastic agent need not even believe a single logical consequence of any
of her beliefs. Nor need she obey Conj and believe the conjunction of any two
propositions she believes.
Indeed, suppose our ideal doxastic agent has one of the boldest Jamesian de-
gree of belief functions, one that assigns to each proposition the maximal degree
of belief or else the minimal degree of belief (James 1896). It is compatible with
this and High 5 and Low and (a complete version of) 1-3 (even in their logically
stronger formulations) that the ideal doxastic agent’s belief relation is the most
cautious of all Cliffordian belief relations, the one that suspends judgment with
respect to all propositions (Clifford 1877). In other words, the epistemology of
belief that results from the epistemology of degrees of belief on the permissibility
solution is, in this precise sense, empty.
Replacing the Lockean thesis by High 5 (and Low) resolves the inconsistency.
This much is true of the permissibility solution. However, this much is also true
if we simply drop the Lockean thesis and with it the epistemology of belief, as
Jeffrey (1970) recommends. It also true if we bite the bullet and deny Conj, as
recommended by Kyburg (1970); or, as recommended by Spohn (2009), if we
develop two parallel epistemologies, viz. the epistemology of belief and the epis-
temology of degrees of belief. Indeed, this much is true even if we adopt High 3
or High 2, both of which are logically stronger than High 5.
However, replacing the Lockean thesis by High 5 does not solve the paradox,
as our expectations on the epistemology of belief remain not being met. While
the Lockean thesis may not give us the epistemology of belief we have expected,
it at least gives us an epistemology of belief. The permissibility solution does
not give us an epistemology of belief that we did not expect. But that is only
because, much like the recommendation by Jeffrey (1970), it does not give us an
epistemology of belief at all.
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Postscriptum on conditional obligations
According to the logic of conditional obligations, the following rule of inference
preserves the designated value (is truth-preserving, if one thinks that conditional
norms have truth values), and hence preserves deontic validity (my preferred logic
of conditional obligations is sketched in Huber 2014: 2180ff):
L From P (C | D) and O (D | C) and O (A | D) infer O (A | C).
L says that conditional obligations are transitive if the condition C is permissible
given the “middleman” D. The more conditions are permissible given various
middlemen, the fewer assumptions about admissibility are needed. It is in this
sense that what counts as permissible will depend on the underlying deontic logic.
Suppose the underlying deontic logic included the axiom schema: P (C | D) or `
O (¬C | D), ` specifying derivability from a complete version of 1-3, Low, Locke
4 for empty X and Y. Then no assumptions about admissibility would be needed.
9
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Thomas Kroedel and Kevin Kuhl for comments on earlier versions
of this note.
My research was supported by the Canadian SSHRC through its Insight pro-
gram and by the Connaught Foundation through its New Researcher program.
10
References
Alchourrón, Carlos E. & Gärdenfors, Peter & Makinson, David (1985), On the
Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions.
Journal of Symbolic Logic 50, 510-530.
Clifford, William K. (1877), The Ethics of Belief. In T. Madigan (ed., 1999), The
Ethics of Belief and Other Essays. Amherst, MA: Prometheus Books, 70-96.
Foley, Richard (2009), Belief, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. In
F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library 342.
Dordrecht: Springer, 37-47.
Hawthorne, James (2009), The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief. In F.
Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library 342. Dor-
drecht: Springer, 49-74.
Hempel, Carl Gustav (1962), Deductive-Nomological vs. Statistical Explana-
tion. In H. Feigl & G. Maxwell (eds.), Scientific Explanation, Space and Time.
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 3. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 98-169.
Hintikka, Jaakko (1961), Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Logic of
the Two Notions. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Reissued as J. Hintikka
(2005), Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.
Prepared by V.F. Hendricks & J. Symons. London: King’s College Publications.
Huber, Franz (2014), New Foundations for Counterfactuals. Synthese 191, 2167-
2193.
Hume, David (1739/1896), A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. by L.A. Selby-
Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
James, William (1896), The Will to Believe. In F. Burkhardt & F. Bowers &
I. Skrupskelis (eds., 1979), The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular
Philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 291-341.
Jeffrey, Richard C. (1970), Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Be-
lief. In M. Swain (ed.), Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief. Dordrecht:
D. Reidel, 157-185.
11
Joyce, James M. (1998), A Non-Pragmatic Vindication of Probabilism. Philoso-
phy of Science 65, 575-603.
Joyce, James M. (2009), Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic
Epistemology of Partial Belief. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees
of Belief. Synthese Library 342. Dordrecht: Springer, 263-297.
Kroedel, Thomas (2012), The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Per-
missibility. Analysis 52, 57-60.
Kroedel, Thomas (2013a), The Permissibility Solution to the Lottery Paradox –
Reply to Littlejohn. Logos and Episteme 4, 103-111.
Kroedel, Thomas (2013b), Why Epistemic Permissions Don’t Agglomerate –
Another Reply to Littlejohn. Logos and Episteme 4, 451-455.
Kyburg, Henry E. Jr. (1961), Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief. Mid-
dletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
Kyburg, Henry E. Jr. (1970), Conjunctivitis. In M. Swain (ed.), Induction, Ac-
ceptance, and Rational Belief. Dordrecht: Reidel, 232-254.
Leitgeb (2013), Reducing Belief Simpliciter to Degrees of Belief. Annals of Pure
and Applied Logic 164, 1338-1389.
Littlejohn, Clayton (2012), Lotteries, Probabilities, and Permissions. Logos and
Episteme 3, 509-514.
Lin, Hanti & Kelly, Kevin T. (2012), Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Prob-
abilistic Reasoning. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41, 957-981.
Morgenstern, Christian (1910), Palmström. Berlin: B. Cassirer.
Spohn, Wolfgang (2009), A Survey of Ranking Theory. In F. Huber & C.
Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library 342. Dordrecht:
Springer, 185-228.
van Frasseen, Bas C. (1972), The Logic of Conditional Obligation. Journal of
Philosophical Logic 1, 417-438.
Wolen´ski, Jan (1990), Deontic Logic and Possible Worlds Semantics: A Histor-
ical Sketch. Studia Logica 49, 273-282.
12
